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Abstract
This study argues that the delegation of monetary policy control by one country
to another can reduce inﬂation in the delegating country. Hyperinﬂation is
common in a divided society, one in which special interest groups can pressure
a weak central government to issue money to ﬁnance their own demands while
neglecting the country’s overall welfare. A commitment device like dollariza-
tion or a currency board, which gives control of the divided country’s money
supply to another country, can eliminate this inﬂation bias. This is illustrated by
Argentina’s experience with inﬂation and a currency board which, in effect,
gave control of Argentina’s money supply to the United States. This argument
is made precise using a two-country overlapping generations model to study the
effects of delegation. The study also ﬁnds that a dollarization treaty between the
two countries can be welfare-improving for both.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.This article studies the effects of political institutions on
inﬂation.Inourview,hyperinﬂationisthemanifestationof
a tragedy of commons in a divided society with a weak
centralmonetary authority.Economies withﬁatmoney are
inherently inﬂation-prone: the collection of seigniorage
through the inﬂation tax is less conspicuous than other
taxes, and the printing of money is essentially costless. In
manycountries,thecontrolofthemoneysupplyisdefacto
or de jure decentralized. Sets of agents (in various regions
or interest groups) can effectively pressure the central gov-
ernment to ﬁnance their expenditures. As these interest
groups pursue their self-interest, they neglect the welfare
effects of the inﬂation tax on individuals in other groups.
Theseelementscombinetoimplythatcountrieswhichrely
on the inﬂation tax to meet the resource demands of com-
petinginterestgroupswilltypicallyexperienceinefficiently
(due to negative spillovers) high inﬂation.
After developing this view of inﬂation, we consider
institutional designs that can reduce inﬂation. We argue
that the delegation of monetary policy, through either a
currency board or dollarization, can serve as a commit-
ment device and thus eliminate the inﬂation bias created
by decentralized monetary policy. We construct a treaty
between the dollarized country and the United States so
that dollarization is welfare-improving for both parties.
OurresearchismotivatedbyrecenteventsinArgentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, Russia, and other countries that have con-
sidered the delegation of monetary authority to reduce in-
ﬂation. In various ways, these countries have experienced
episodes of inﬂation which can be traced to the decentral-
ization of monetary policy.
Argentina provides a leading example. Over the past
40 years, its average annual rate of inﬂation has been
relatively high (compared to, say, the U.S. rate). Argen-
tina’s annual inﬂation rate averaged 30.3 percent over the
1963–73 period, rose to 200 percent during 1973–78, and
then increased once again to an annual average rate of 380
percent during 1983–87 (Edwards and Tabellini 1990, Ta-
ble1).Inﬂationreached3,066.3percentby1989.Weargue
that this high inﬂation experience is connected with the
decentralization of monetary policy. World Bank (1990),
Aizenman(1998),andSaieghandTommasi(1999)provide
a detailed discussion of the interactions between Argen-
tina’s provinces and central government. Argentina has a
decentralized system with 23 semi-sovereign provinces
with budgets that are funded, in part, by the central ﬁscal
and monetary authorities. Combined with a reliance on the
inﬂationtax,theresourcedemandsoftheprovincesprovide
a basis for inﬂation.
Our thesis that the delegation of monetary control can
reduce inﬂation is brought out by the experience of Argen-
tina. Since 1995, inﬂation in Argentina has plummeted to
an annual rate of less than 5 percent. In 1999, Argentina
experienced deﬂation as prices fell by −2.2 percent.
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What lies behind this rather abrupt reduction in the rate
of inﬂation in Argentina over the last decade? In 1991,
Argentine law created a currency board, which, in effect,
relinquished control of Argentina’s money supply to the
United States. Under this institutional setting, Argentina’s
provincial governments could no longer pressure the cen-
tral monetary authority for transfers ﬁnanced by seignior-
age.
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Recently, Argentina began consideration of dollariza-
tion,amonetarysysteminwhichacountrysubstitutesU.S.
dollars for its own currency and essentially relinquishes
control of its monetary policy to the United States.3 Thus,
the delegation of monetary policy has been used as a tool
to reduce the rate of inﬂation.
Argentina is by no means the only example of the link
betweeninﬂationandthedecentralizationofmonetarypol-
icy. A similar experience arose in the infancy of the Com-
munity of Independent States in the early 1990s, when lo-
cal expenditures were ﬁnanced by the Russian Central
Bank. Aizenman (1998) discusses the experience of Brazil
fromthisperspective.Forothercountries,suchasEcuador,
we think of various interest groups able to pressure a weak
central government to issue money for ﬁnancing their own
demands.Ecuadoradoptedadollarizationregimein2000.
To formally explore the effects of institutions on inﬂa-
tion, we construct a model with two key features: reliance
on the inﬂation tax and speciﬁcation of multiple regions
with sufficient power to inﬂuence the behavior of the cen-
tral monetary authority. We think of this as an abstract
modelofaparticularcommitmentproblemthatstemsfrom
the inﬂationpressures exerted by interest groupsin a coun-
try, such as Argentina.
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In equilibrium, inﬂation is inefficiently excessive. Act-
ing in the interests of their own citizens, these regional
governments use their inﬂuence over the central govern-
ment to redistribute resources in their favor. For simplicity,
we think of these as transfers to a region. If a region’s
transfer is ﬁnanced by an increase in the supply of money,
then there is inﬂation. The inﬂation tax is costly because it
reduces the real return to work, and thus both employment
and output fall as inﬂation rises. In equilibrium, the inﬂa-
tion is excessive due to negative spillovers: the inﬂation
tax is borne by all agents in the economy. The high inﬂa-
tion rate reﬂects the inability of the central government to
commit to not responding to the demands of the regional
governments for a share of seigniorage.
In addition to illustrating inﬂation from this type of
commitment problem, we identify conditions such that the
delegation of monetary policy, say, through dollarization,
can reduce inﬂation and increase the welfare of agents in
Argentina. Essentially, the delegation allows the central
government to resist the demands of the regional govern-
mentsforseigniorage-ﬁnancedtransfers.Further,usingour
general equilibrium model, we are also able to discuss the
implicationsofdollarizationfortheUnitedStates.Indoing
so, we characterize an optimal treaty that would eliminate
any incentive for the United States to inﬂate once Argen-
tina dollarizes.
Multiple Interest Groups
and a Weak Central Government
DrawingonCooperandKempf2001,weanalyzeinﬂation
in an overlapping-generations model of the world econ-
omy. We assume there are two countries, say, Argentina
and the United States for concreteness.
5 Here we study the
allocations that arise when each country has its own cur-
rency. We turn to other institutions in the next section.
The ﬁrst country (Argentina) is composed of two re-
gions. Each region acts noncooperatively and is able to
force the central monetary authority to print money that is
transferreddirectlytothatregion.
6Theseregionsthushave
independent power over the central monetary authority,
and this creates the basis for the inﬂation. Each region, ineffect, chooses to print money for its own purpose. Our
speciﬁcation of the multiple regions, that is, a divided so-
ciety, is intended to capture the fact that in some econo-
mies, the conduct of policy may not be as centrally co-
ordinated as it is in the United States.
Thisspeciﬁcationcanbeviewedasacommitmentprob-
lem of the monetary authority. The regions move ﬁrst, ef-
fectively setting transfer to their citizens. The central gov-
ernment moves second and ﬁnances these transfers by
printing money. The central government is weak in this
sense, and thus a commitment problem exists.
Thesecondcountry(UnitedStates)isanintegratedfed-
eration with a single monetary authority which acts in the
interests of the representative agent. By construction, there
are no interest groups or regional governments that can
pressure the central monetary authority to inﬂate in the
United States.
We ﬁrst consider the optimization problems of repre-
sentative young agents in each of the two countries. We
thendiscusstheequilibriumforgivengovernmentpolicies.
Finally, we characterize optimal government policies.
Individual Optimization
Individual agents in the model are assumed to work in
youth and consume in old age. Because the single con-
sumption good is produced in both Argentina and the
United States, consumption goods can be purchased in
either country. However, we impose a cash-in-advance




In Argentina (home), there are two regions. The govern-
ments in these regions make money transfers to agents
when they are old. Here we assume that all transfers are
ﬁnanced by printing money. Thus, the model is simpliﬁed
to focus on seigniorage.
8 Again, this is the essence of the
commitmentproblemwithinArgentina:thecentralgovern-
ment is unable to resist the demands of the regional gov-
ernments.
The optimization problem for a representative young


























































Constraint (2) implies that total consumption (c
k
t+1)i s
the sum of home goods (superscript h) and foreign goods
(superscript f). We have simpliﬁed matters by assuming
that these goods are perfect substitutes. Constraints (3) and
(4) are the cash-in-advance constraints, requiring that local
currency be used to ﬁnance purchases. Constraint (3) in-
cludes a transfer (τ
k
t+1) from the home government to the
agent. This transfer is not present in constraint (4) because
the home agent does not receive transfers from the foreign
government. In constraint (5), the agent’s earnings (in




h) and foreign (m
k
t
f) currency, where et is the home
currency price of foreign currency in period t. Here we as-
sume that the agent’s output is proportional to labor input.
There are two ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior so-
















Condition (6) is an arbitrage condition: if money holdings
are interior, then the agent must be indifferent with regard
to his or her portfolio composition. This condition is sim-
ilar to the law of one price, but there is a lag involved, re-
ﬂecting the cash-in-advance constraint.
9 Condition (7) re-
ﬂects the optimal choice of employment. The right side is
the marginal utility loss of working, while the left side
represents the marginal gain from selling output in the
home market at a price p
h
t and then buying goods in the
next period at a price ph





t+1. Since the money transfer is lump-
sum, it does not factor into the marginal return on work,
though it does inﬂuence employment through a wealth ef-
fect.
United States
The optimization problem for a representative young U.S.
agent of generation t parallels that of an agent in Argen-

























































The constraints are essentially the same as those for Ar-
gentina. There are two ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior











Given Money Creation Rates
We now characterize the conditions for market-clearing.
Throughout the analysis, we focus on steady states where
money supplies grow at constant rates and employment,
output, and consumption levels are constant over time
(though they may vary across countries and across regions
within a country).
10 Accordingly, we assume that govern-
mentshaveselectedconstantgrowthrates:σ
*isthegrowth
rate of the U.S. money supply and σ
k is the growth rate in
region k in Argentina. Given these growth rates, the trans-













Because there are two currencies, we have two conditions













for the United States. In these expressions, I
k is the num-




total real output in Argentina, I
* is the U.S. population, Mt
is the money supply in Argentina, and M*
t is the money
supply in the United States.







This expression comes from substituting the market-clear-
ing conditions into the agent’s budget constraint. Here σ
is the growth rate of the aggregate stock of money in





t+1 = 1/(1+σ), the






The equilibrium employment levels in Argentina depend
on the rates of money creation in each of the two regions
(σ
1,σ
2). It is important to realize that, in general, equation
(19) implies that employment in region k will depend on
each of these money creation rates and not just their sum.
These two expressions make clear the nature of the
interaction across regions in determining the rate of mon-
ey creation in Argentina. Given σ, the consumption level
of agents in region k is increasing in the rate of money
creation in that region, σk. This effect captures the idea
that by inﬂating, a region can capture a larger fraction of
total output. But inﬂation is costly since, from (19), output
falls as the rate of inﬂation in Argentina rises.
11 The equi-
librium level of inﬂation will balance these forces. Fur-
ther, as σ increases given σ
k, welfare falls: this is the neg-
ative spillover alluded to earlier.
Using the market-clearing conditions and the assump-
tion of a single region in the United States, we have that
the consumption by a representative, generation t U.S.
agent is n
*.12 Using this as well as the rate of return in
terms of home currency, we have that the ﬁrst-order con-





In fact, this expression is identical to one in a closed econ-
omy model where the sequence of employment levels de-
pends only on the home rate of inﬂation. The rate of mon-
ey creation in Argentina has no effect on the employment
or consumption of U.S. agents: the U.S. economy is in-
sulated from the money creation process in Argentina.
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Given these expressions, we can more formally deﬁne
asteady-stateequilibrium.Forthiseconomy,asteady-state
equilibrium is a pair of employment levels (n
1,n
2) that
satisﬁes (19) for the regions of Argentina and the employ-
ment level n
* for the United States that solves equation
(20). Equilibrium prices are determined so that markets
clear for each of the currencies at these equilibrium quan-
tities. The exchange rate is then determined from the arbi-
trage condition (6). From this condition, the rate of depre-
ciation of the exchange rate will equal the difference in the
rates of money growth in the United States and Argentina.
Equilibrium Money Creation
Here we use two conﬁgurations of regional power in our
model to determine the equilibrium level of money cre-
ation.
Clearly, regional governments will attempt to use their
inﬂuence over the printing press to increase the consump-
tion of their citizens. Who pays the inﬂation tax that each
of these regional governments levies? In our environment,
we ﬁnd that the inﬂation tax is paid by citizens in the other
regionofArgentina.Inﬂationisexcessive.U.S.citizensare
insulated from the inﬂation tax by the cash-in-advance
constraint: from (20), the allocation in the United States is
independent of the inﬂation rate in Argentina.
To highlight the commitment problem created by the
inability of the central monetary authority in Argentina to
refrain from ﬁnancing regional transfers, we assume that
the regions set their respective money growth rates at the
start of time. Given these growth rates, the steady-state
equilibrium is characterized bythe solutions to (19) for k =
1, 2 and condition (20). The regions have no incentive to
deviate from these inﬂation paths as long as the rate of
inﬂation is chosen before agents make their labor supply
decisions.
For the U.S. government, the choice of money creation
is simple. Given the insulation property of the model, only
U.S. citizens would bear the inﬂation tax. Because this tax
is distortionary, the optimal setting is σ
* = 0. From (20),
zero money growth and thus zero inﬂation imply that the
equilibrium level of employment is efficient because n
*
solves the planner’s problem:
(21) maxn(u(n) − g(n)).
The same argument would apply to Argentina if mone-
tary policy were centralized and beyond the inﬂuence of
the regional governments: the socially efficient level of in-
ﬂation is zero. But Argentina is composed of multiple re-
gions that can independently inﬂuence the rate of money
creation. Hence, the equilibrium level of inﬂation, created
bytheoutcomeoftheinteractionbetweentheregions,may
not be efficient.
We study two conﬁgurations of regional power in Ar-
gentina. In the symmetric case, we assume that both re-
gions are equally able to pressure the central monetary
authority to inﬂate. In the asymmetric case, we assume
that a unique region within Argentina is able to exert pres-
sure on the central monetary authority and beneﬁt from
seigniorage, whereas the other region is exposed to the in-
ﬂation tax. We motivate and study these in turn.
In either case, without further restrictions on utility, the
interaction of income and substitution effects induced by
region-speciﬁc transfers can be complex. To simplify mat-
ters and thus to be more speciﬁc about equilibrium allo-cations as we study the choice of money creation rates, we
assume that the utility function of a representative agent in
either country is given by
(22) u(c) − g(n)=c− [n
1+γ/(1+γ)]
where γ > 0. With these preferences, the equilibrium em-
ployment rule for an agent in any region in Argentina is
simply
(23) 1 = (1+σ)n
γ
so that income effects induced by money creation have no
effect on labor supply and only the sum of the inﬂation
rates matters.
14 Here the elasticity of the labor supply with
respect to the real return on work, 1/(1+σ), equals 1/γ.
Likewise, for the U.S. representative agent, employment
satisﬁes




Within Argentina, there is an incentive for each region to
inﬂate since the tax imposed by the government in region
k is paid in part by agents in the other region. The gov-
ernment of region kchooses σ
kto maximize the welfare of
a representative agent in that region, equation (22), where
c
k is given by equation (18) and n
k solves equation (23).
The government takes as given the money creation rate of
the other government. But each government recognizes its
effect on the overall rate of inﬂation in Argentina and thus
internalizes the response of all workers in both regions
through (23).
15 Optimization by each of the regional gov-
ernments leads to a pair of ﬁrst-order conditions:
(25) (1+σ)(Y/I





for k =1 ,2 .
These two conditions represent the best-response func-
tions for the interaction between the two governments. We
focus on a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both
governments optimally choose the same rate of inﬂation.
Assume that I1 = I
2 = I so that the regions are of equal
size. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium within Argentina,
σ
1 = σ
2 = σ ~, so that the economywide rate of money cre-
ation (σ)i s2 σ ~. Let ñ denote the steady-state employment
level. Hence, total output in Argentina is 2Iñin a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1. When both regions can print money, the
rate of inﬂation is positive in a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. When the conditions for a symmetric Nash equi-
librium are imposed and Y =2 Iñ, σ ~ must satisfy
(26) (1+2σ ~)2ñ(1+φ) = (1+2σ ~)ñ
where φ is the elasticity of total output in Argentina with
respect to the inﬂation rate of one region:
(27) φ(σ ~) ≡ (σ ~/ñ)(∂n/∂σ
k).
Here the partial derivative is evaluated at σ ~, though the
change in employment is the one induced by a variation
in the regional level of inﬂation. When equation (26) is
simpliﬁed, the symmetric Nash equilibrium level of mon-
ey creation solves
(28) φ(σ ~)=−1/2.
Using the preferences given in (22), we can solve for φ(σ ~):
(29) φ(σ ~)=−[σ ~/γ(1+2σ ~)].
Thus, the equilibrium rate of inﬂation must satisfy
(30) σ ~ = γ/2(1−γ). Q.E.D.
Let V
d, where the d denotes decentralized, represent the
lifetime utility of a representative agent in Argentina in
this equilibrium. This value is calculated using the pref-
erences given in (22) with the labor input determined by
(23) evaluated at the equilibrium rate of inﬂation, equation
(30). In the symmetric equilibrium, each region gets an
equal share of total output. However, because total output
is falling in the rate of inﬂation, the higher the inﬂation,
the lower the welfare in Argentina.
To interpret this equilibrium, note that if each region
inﬂates at a rate of 50 percent, the economywide growth
rate of the money stock will be 100 percent. This will be
the equilibrium output if γ = 0.5. The equilibrium rate of
inﬂation is an increasing function of γ for γ∈[0,1). At
γ = 1, the rate of inﬂation is inﬁnite.
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In this economy, where both regions can pressure the
central monetary authority to print money, there is an in-
ﬂation bias. Here both regions would beneﬁt if the rate of
inﬂation were forced to zero, which, as argued above, is
the efficient rate of inﬂation. Thus, the structure in the
symmetric case is that of a prisoner’s dilemma, where the
equilibriumentailspositiveinﬂation,yetzeroinﬂationpro-
duces a Pareto preferred outcome.
The Asymmetric Case
If just a single region (say, k =1 )i si n ﬂating, then the
government of region 1 chooses σ
1 to maximize the wel-
fare of a representative agent in that region, (22), where c
1
is given by (18) and n
1 solves (23), where σ = σ
1 because
only one region is inﬂating. The ﬁrst-order condition to






PROPOSITION 2. When only region 1 can print money, the
rate of money creation is given by
(32) σ =( λ−1)γ/λ
where λ is deﬁned as the inverse of the share of the total
population in region 1:




Proof. When the deﬁnition of total output and (22) are
used, (30) can be written as
(34) (1+σ)λ[1 − σ/γ(1+σ)] = (1+σλ).
Simple algebra reduces this condition to(35) σ =( λ−1)γ/λ. Q.E.D.
Clearly, if only a single region inﬂates, it will use its
power to tax agents in the other region. The inﬂation rate
will increase as the size of the other region increases rel-
ative to the region that controls the printing press. This
makes sense: as the tax base increases, so will the inﬂation
rate. It is important to be speciﬁc about the measure of this
tax base. We can show that if the two regions differ in
terms of productivity, then λ will be the inverse of region
1’s share of total gross domestic product (GDP) in the
country.
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Also, the rate of inﬂation will be lower if the response
of output (1/γ)t oi n ﬂation is higher. Essentially, the region
1 government recognizes that its inﬂation will reduce total
output at a rate parameterized by (1/γ).
Relative to the symmetric case in which both regions
can inﬂate, the rate of inﬂation is lower in the asymmetric
case. We can see this by comparing equation (32) to equa-
tion (30) with λ = 2. Intuitively, when both regions can
inﬂate, their attempts to grab a large share of the econom-
ic pie magnify the gain to the inﬂation tax by a single re-
gion.
As in the symmetric case, the United States has no in-
centive to inﬂate. It is unable to tax Argentine citizens and
does not wish to incur the distortion of the inﬂation tax.
Part of the inﬂation tax in Argentina is paid by citizens
of region2,whichlacksanyabilityto taxcitizensinregion
1.Consequently, thegameinthe asymmetriccasedoesnot
correspond to a prisoner’s dilemma as it did in the sym-
metric case. From a welfare perspective, the citizens in re-
gion 1 do not suffer from an inﬂation problem, though citi-
zens in region 2 think otherwise.
Dollarization
Can dollarization solve the inﬂation problem? Here we
focus on dollarization as a way to delegate monetary pol-
icy to an outside authority. Currency boards are another
such mechanism, but may be a weaker form of delegation
since the monetary authority may retain some degree of
freedom in adjusting the money supply.
The equilibrium in Argentina has a positive rate of in-
ﬂation. If both regions can inﬂate, we have argued that the
outcome is one of excessive inﬂation and that all agents
would beneﬁt from a commitment not to inﬂate. Even if
only a single region is able to inﬂuence the policy of the
central monetary authority, we see that inﬂation is a result
as well. Here, though, the welfare costs of inﬂation are not
asclearsinceoneregionisbeneﬁtingfromtheinﬂationtax
that is borne by another. Using a social welfare function
that gives weight to region 2 agents would imply that the
rate of inﬂation given in (32) is too high. Or, given a po-
litical process in which the region 2 agents could express
their displeasure over the inﬂation tax, remedial action
would be warranted. Thus, we take it as given that there is
an inﬂation problem in Argentina in our model economy.
Equilibrium
Suppose that Argentina dollarizes so that there is a single
currency in the two-country economy, and the supply of
thiscurrencyiscontrolledbytheU.S.centralmonetaryau-
thority. This economy with two countries is isomorphic to
thetwo-regionmodelofArgentinastudiedearlier.Herethe
United States is region 1 and Argentina is region 2. Let
variables with the superscripts Uand Arefer to allocations
in the United States and Argentina, respectively. The equi-
libriumemploymentlevels foragivenmoneycreationrate
(now set by the U.S. monetary authority) are given by
















A. As in the earlier analysis, this system of two
equations determines the employment levels in each of the
two countries.
If the United States maintains a zero rate of money cre-
ation, then the utility of U.S. agents will be the same as in
the economy with multiple currencies. But this is not nec-
essarily an equilibrium. Instead, the United States will
choose the rate of money creation to maximize the utility
of the representative U.S. agent. The result of Proposition
2 holds: the United States will have an incentive to inﬂate.
Let V
$ be the lifetime utility of an agent in Argentina
under a dollarization scheme with the United States. Will
Argentina necessarily gain from dollarization? That is, un-
der what conditions is V
$ > V
d? We see one condition
from Proposition 2: the magnitude of U.S. inﬂation will
dependontherelative sizesofthetwo countries.Thegains
for the United States from inﬂation rise with the size of the
Argentine population relative to the size of the U.S. popu-
lation. So V
$ will necessarily fall with the relative size of
the country that dollarizes with the United States.
The other condition is the degree of decentralization of
monetary policy within a country. All else the same, as the
decentralization problem worsens (through the creation of
more interest groups), V
d will necessarily fall. This pro-
vides a larger gain from dollarization for those countries.
Thus, for a small country (relative to the United States)
with high inﬂation due to the decentralization of monetary
policy, there are clearly gains to dollarization. The fact that
the country is small implies that the United States will not
have much of an incentive to inﬂate, and thus the small
country will clearly gain from dollarization. However, for
a large country, the incentive for the United States to in-
ﬂate may be signiﬁcant. Further, if the large country does
not suffer much from an inﬂation bias, then dollarization
may not reduce inﬂation. In this case, the large country is
better off using its own currency.
We can take this argument further to imagine a setting
in which there are N + 1 identical countries, with N of
them simultaneously choosing whether or not to dollarize
and the remaining country being the United States. Each
of the N countries may perceive a gain to dollarization as
a means of reducing inefficiently high inﬂation. Yet, from
Proposition 2, the costs of joining the group of dollarized
countries will depend on the relative size of the dollarized
bloc relative to the size of the United States.
This setting suggests that there exists an equilibrium
number of countries using a given currency. Suppose that
if only one country dollarizes, then V
$ exceeds V
d.A st h e
number of countries increases, V
$ decreases and V
d stays
the same. Thus, an N
* clearly exists such that an interna-
tional arrangement with only N
*countries dollarizing is anequilibrium in that none of the countries wishes to leave




The resulting U.S. inﬂation represents a cost to Argentina
since its citizens pay part of the inﬂation tax. Thus, they
have an incentive to try to limit U.S. inﬂation.
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In fact, Senator Connie Mack introduced the Interna-
tional Monetary Stability Act in the U.S. Senate with a
provision to share seigniorage under such settings. While
this act may partly reﬂect a desire to compensate Argen-
tina for the seigniorage it would lose by giving up its own
currency, such an act, or treaty, could serve another pur-
pose. We can use our model to solve for the terms of a
treaty that would eliminate the incentive for the United
States to inﬂate.
Let ρ denote the share of newly printed money that is
transferred to U.S. agents. Then in the dollarization re-
gime,theconsumptionlevelsofU.S.andArgentineagents














For a given value of the sharing parameter, the U.S.
government maximizes the welfare of its representative
agent by choosing the rate of money creation. In doing so,
it takes into account the labor supply response of agents
in Argentina to variations in σ through (23). The ﬁrst-












Evaluating this condition at σ = 0 will determine the
value of ρ such that the United States is induced to
choose zero money creation. This value for ρ is given by
(41) ρ = GDPUS/(GDPArg+GDPUS)
where GDPx is the nominal value of GDP in country x.
From 1999 World Bank data, ρ= 0.97.
20 Thus, if the Unit-
ed States agrees to share 3 percent of seigniorage with Ar-
gentina, any incentive for the United States to inﬂate under
a dollarization regime will be thwarted.
A Solution?
Suppose that a treaty is agreed upon which implies that the
United States will not inﬂate. Will dollarization solve the
commitment problem in Argentina? The answer depends
on the nature of the relationship between the regional gov-
ernments and the central government in Argentina. In our
analysis, we have assumed that the central monetary au-
thority in Argentina lacks commitment power relative to
theregionalgovernments.Asaconsequence,themonetary
authority must ﬁnd a way to commit to not ﬁnancing the
regional ﬁscal deﬁcits.
What about the ﬁscal authorities at the federal levels?
If the central ﬁscal authority is strong and thus not suscep-
tible to pressures from the regional governments, then the
delegation of monetary control to the United States will
solve the internal problems in Argentina. In this case,
dollarization along with an optimal treaty will suppose the
planner’s solution.
However, suppose the ﬁscal authority is also unable to
commit to its policies. Then the same interactions across
regions that led to the inﬂation will appear. That is, each
region will have an incentive to run a deﬁcit which will
be ﬁnanced by taxes on other regions and levied by the
central ﬁscal authority. This is a type of tax shifting. There
will be no inﬂation, but there will be higher federal taxes
and more distortions in the aggregate.
This is more than a theoretical possibility. In Novem-
ber 2000, the Argentine federal government and the prov-
inces (again) negotiated a ﬁscal pact to ﬁx transfers and
to limit spending at the provincial level.
In brief, if the federal government can succeed in rein-
ing in the ﬁscal pressure imposed by the provinces, then
the need for dollarization will be dramatically reduced. If
not and the pressure continues, then dollarization would
only succeed in redirecting the pressure away from the
central bank. The core of the monetary problem is ﬁscal
irresponsibility, not the choice of the currency.
Concluding Thoughts and Extensions
We have argued that there may indeed be gains to dol-
larizationforArgentinabecausethedelegationofmonetary
policycansolveaninternalcommitmentproblem.As long
as Argentina is able to constrain the tax-shifting of its re-
gions, dollarization will enable it to strengthen its central
monetaryauthorityandthusescapefromsociallycostlyin-
ﬂation. In this case, the outcome with dollarization (forti-
ﬁed by a treaty with the United States) will yield a higher
level of welfare than a ﬂexible exchange rate system.
Our argument for some form of delegation relies on a
commitment problem within Argentina. Interestingly, the
commitment problem is quite different from the more tra-
ditional one between the government and private agents
highlighted by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Still, our
model solves a “puzzle”suggested by the more traditional
framework. Within that framework, the vast difference in
the U.S. and Argentine inﬂation experiences can be ex-
plained if the government in Argentina suffers less of a
loss from inﬂation.
21 But why should the loss from inﬂa-
tion be so different across these countries? These differ-
ences in political tastes presumably stem from institutional
differences in these countries. Our model provides an ex-
planation through the decentralization of monetary policy.
Thereareundoubtedlymanyotherpertinentdimensions
of dollarization to consider. Though including them in our
abstract model is beyond the scope of this study, it is none-
theless useful to informally discuss some of the leading
points.
• Dollarization versus a currency board. Argentina cur-
rently has a currency board and has been contemplat-
ing dollarization. Our model is silent about the differ-
ences between these institutions since, in effect, they
both delegate monetary policy to the United States.
There is speculation that dollarization is a stronger
form of commitment, though this is an open issue.
• Stabilization policy. To the extent that active mone-
tary policy has value as a tool of stabilization, the
delegation of monetary policy may have a cost. Re-
linquishing control over the money supply is a keycomponent in the analysis of Mundell (1961), though
formalizing these costs is more difficult.
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• Exchange rate crises. One of the supposed beneﬁts of
dollarization stems from the reduction of uncertainty
over nominal exchange rates. Because there were no
exchange rate crises in our model economy with mul-
tiple currencies, evaluating this argument is not pos-
sible.
• Financial fragility. A ﬁnal but important concern
arises from other potential costs of delegation. As is
well understood, monetary policy has elements be-
yond attempts to inﬂuence prices and the level of
economic activity. In particular, the central bank has
a valuable role as a lender of last resort. Dollarization
means that Argentina will not have the ability to pro-
vide liquidity to its banks and will be unable to ﬁ-
nance deposit insurance through the printing press.
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• Trade and integration. A rationale for dollarization is
clearly linked to the desire to foster economic inte-
gration through trade or even political bonds. It is
certainly what motivated Panama to adopt the dollar
in the early 20th century (1907).
These important extensions are left for future analysis.
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CNRS as well as helpful conversations with Patrick Kehoe, Tim Kehoe, Narayana
Kocherlakota, and Art Rolnick on this topic. The authors are grateful to Carlos
Zarazaga for supplying some data, to Aleh Tsyvinski for research assistance, and to
seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City for comments.
1These ﬁgures are from the World Bank Group, available at http://devdata.world
bank.org.
2See Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf 2000 for discussions of this law and its conse-
quences. Under a constitutional provision, the Argentine central bank was required to
sell dollars for pesos at an exchange rate of one-for-one and was required to maintain
reserves, consisting of gold, foreign currency, or bonds convertible in gold and foreign
currency, at a level at least equal to the monetary base.
3We focus on official dollarization, where a country adopts a foreign currency as
legal tender. Of course, there is also unofficial dollarization, where agents within a
country choose to use the dollar as a medium of exchange and a store of value. Bogetic ´
(2000) discusses this distinction and country-speciﬁc experiences.
4For related presentations of this theme, see Aizenman 1992 and Zarazaga 1999.
For a survey of dollarization in Argentina, see Velde and Veracierto 2000.
5While we use Argentina as an example throughout the article, we think that the
trade-offs illuminated in our model apply more broadly.
6In Cooper and Kempf 2001, we provide a more detailed model of the ﬁscal and
monetary relationships between these regions and the central government.
7Restrictions of this form are commonly used in these models to generate deter-
minant currency demands. A rationale for these restrictions is put forth in Cooper and
Kempf 1998.
8Cooper and Kempf (2001) broaden this structure to include ﬁscal policy. See a
discussion by Chari and Kehoe (1997) as well.





t+1et+1, will not hold. Thus, models that both assume this condition and impose cash-
in-advance constraints are not properly speciﬁed.
10We deﬁne the steady state more formally below. We focus on steady states for
tractability. Of course, there is a continuum of nonstationary equilibria for the over-
lapping-generations model.
11This assumes that substitution effects dominate income effects in the agent’s re-
sponse to a variation in the real return to work.
12Here we use the fact that in equilibrium the currency portfolio of an agent is not
determined. So we assume that agents hold only their own currencies.
13As discussed in Cooper and Kempf 2001, this insulation property reﬂects the
imposition of cash-in-advance constraints and thus may provide another argument in
favor of these constraints. If, following the structure of Kareken and Wallace 1981,
there were no legal restrictions, then in equilibrium the United States would bear some
of the inﬂation tax imposed by the regions in Argentina.
14With the absence of income effects, there is no reason to identify employment
by region so that n represents the labor input per capita in Argentina.
15Analytically, it is easy to characterize the equilibrium in terms of labor inputs us-
ing (18) and (23). Of course, by inﬂuencing equilibrium quantities, the governments al-
so inﬂuence prices.
16For γ > 1, the inﬂation rate appears to be negative, but this is not an equilibrium.
In the two-region model, as γ goes to one so that the elasticity of labor supply falls, the
rate of inﬂation goes to inﬁnity. This reﬂects the fact that with large γ, the distortionary
effect of inﬂation on the labor supply within the region falls. Also note that in the op-
timization problems of the regions, there are no bounds on the rate of money creation
so that the choice set is not compact. For γ sufficiently close to (but less than) one, the
bound will bind. For γ in excess of one, the bound will bind as well.
17Formally, we assume that the two regions are of equal size, and we let output




k is a region-speciﬁc productivity
parameter. Then retracing the steps used in Proposition 2, we see that the rate of money
creation in region 1 is given by σ =( 1 −s
1)γ, where s
1 is region 1’s share of total (Ar-
gentine) GDP. We will use GDP to measure size in our discussion of dollarization.
18Of course, in a more complete model, these other countries may then join an-
other currency bloc.
19Although doing so is clearly welfare-reducing for the United States.
20The data come from http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.
html. Here we are again measuring country size by GDP weights. Using 1999 data, we
are calculating GDP in Argentina during the currency board regime.
21The traditional model relates inﬂation to two parameters: the elasticity of ag-
gregatesupply andthe policymakers’preferencesover inﬂationandthe outputgap.Us-
ing the estimates in Lucas 1973, we see that the Argentine economy is not very re-
sponsive to nominal shocks, reﬂecting the large variability of nominal shocks in that
country.Thus,explainingtheobserveddifferencesintheinﬂationexperienceofthetwo
countries requires different weights on inﬂation and the output gaps. Recent versions
of these models study the importance of reputation effects. From that perspective, the
differences in inﬂation experiences might correspond to various equilibria of the re-
peated game.
22Cooper and Kempf (2000) provide a model of a monetary union in which do-
mestic monetary policy is one of the tools used to ﬁnance unemployment insurance.
In that environment, the delegation of monetary policy to a central bank may lead to
less effective insurance for unemployed agents.
23Of course, this was true during the currency board regime and led to some
problems in responding to banking difficulties in the mid-1990s, as discussed by Carri-
zosa, Leipziger, and Shah (1996).
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